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POSTSCRIPTS

The School Prayer Cases
Recent issues of The Catholic Lawyer
have contained a number of articles dealing with the subject of religious prayers
in the public schools.1 Since the publication of these articles not a great deal has
happened which would surprise one who
is familiar with previous decisions. However, a recent case presents a possible
divergence with the prior trend. This decision may best be viewed in juxtaposition
to the present status of the school prayer
"dilemma."
The United States Supreme Court's
1962 decision in Engel v. Vitale2 condemned the New York State "Regents
Prayer" on the ground that it violated the
establishment clause of the first amendment, applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. The Engel case was
I Regan,

The Dilemma of Religious Instruction
CATHOLIC LAW. 42
(1964); Rice, Let Us Pray-An Amendment to
the Constitution, 10 CATHOLIC LAW. 178 (1964);
Kenealy and Ball, The Proposed Prayer and
Bible-Reading Amendments: Contrasting Views,
10 CATHOLIC LAW. 185 (1964).
2370 U.S. 421 (1962).

and the Public Schools, 10

followed in 1963 by decisions of the
Court which held that under the establishment clause a state may not direct the
use of public school teachers and facilities
for the recitation of a prayer.3 The latest
case in this series is Stein v. Oshinsky,4
decided by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals on July 7, 1965.
In Stein, the principal of a public elementary school ordered his teachers to
stop the recitation of all prayers' in the
school. The Board of Education and the
Board of Regents condoned the principal's actions, and instituted a policy banof
" School Dist.
Schempp, 374 U.S.
Curlett, 374 U.S. 203
4 Stein v. Oshinsky,
1965).
5 The prayer said by

v.
Abington Township
203 (1963); Murray v.
(1963).
348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.
the kindergarten children

in the morning session, before they ate their
cookies and milk, was as follows: "God is
Great, God is Good and We Thank Him for
Our Food, Amen!" The prayer in the afternoon kindergarten classes was:
"Thank You for the World so Sweet,
Thank You for the Food We Eat,
Thank You for the Birds that SingThank You, God, for Everything."

Id. at 1000.

12
ning all prayers in the public schools, even
when the opportunity to pray is sought
by the students and their parents. 6
Suit was instituted by the parents of
several pupils to enjoin the school authorities from preventing the children from
voluntarily reciting simple prayers in the
classrooms. Plaintiffs moved for summary
judgment,7 asserting that the issues were
purely constitutional in nature and, therefore, questions of law only, and not of
fact, were presented. The district court
granted plaintiffs' motion and prohibited
interference with the prayer, indicating
that a reasonable opportunity for such
prayer should be provided each day.
On appeal, plaintiffs contended that
the previous decisions of the Supreme
Court only prevented a state from directing the use of public facilities for the
purpose of prayer, ergo, these decisions
did not prevent a state from permitting
public school students from engaging in
prayer on their own initiative. The court
concluded that neither the free exercise of
religion clause, nor the guarantee of freedom of speech of the first amendment,
compel a state to permit persons to engage in prayer in state-owned facilities
wherever and whenever they desire.0
Though the court stated that it was aware
that the situation of school children is
somewhat unique in that their attendance
at the public schools was compulsory, 10 it
concluded that this would not render reStein v. Oshinsky, supra note 4, at 1000.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
s Stein v. Oshinsky, 224 F. Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y.
1963).
9Poulas v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395,
405 (1953).
10 N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3201-29.
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ligious facilities of the general community
any less accessible to them than they are
to others. 1 The authorities, the court
went on to say, acted within their powers
in refusing to grant the right to pray;
"their action presented no . . . inexorable
conflict with deeply-held religious belief .... . 1 .2 The court then quoted from
the Everson decision:
After all that the states have been told
about keeping the 'wall between church
and state . . . high and impregnable . . .'

it would be rather bitter irony to chastise
New York for having built the wall too tall
and too strong. 18
The court therefore held that it was error
to grant summary judgment for the plaintiffs and reversed, with directions to dis14
miss the complaint.
The Supreme Court has refused to review Stein.'5 Although the Court's refusal
of the appeal was a unanimous one, it
"does not [necessarily] indicate that the
justices agree with [the] reasoning, but
it does suggest that the Court would deal
the same way with any other state that
adopts the same policy.' 6 The chairman
of the parents group formed to fight the
state law on school prayers, after denouncof Abington Township v.
I School Dist.
Schempp, supra note 3, at 299 (concurring
opinion of Brennan, J.); cf. Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 399 n.1 (1963).
-,Stein v. Oshinsky, supra note 4, at 1002. But

see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
" Stein v. Oshinsky, supra note 4, at 1002; see
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-18

(1947).
' The decision of the court to direct the verdict was to bring the matter to a close in the
most expedient way. Stein v. Oshinsky, supra
note 4, at 1002.
15 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1965, p. 1, col. 6.
16 Ibid.
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ing the action of the Court, indicated that
the decision would probably rejuvenate
advocates of a constitutional amendment
to permit school prayers. 17 In contrast,
others, like the New York branch of the
American Civil Liberties Union cheered
the decision, but noted that "the battle
18
against school prayers is not over yet."'
Though one may debate the desirability
of reciting a prayer in the public schools,
it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court
of the United States did not feel compelled to elaborate on one of the most
important and controversial issues of our
time.

The Dilemma of the
Out-of-State Attorney
In the recently decided case of Spivak
v. Sachs,' the New York Court of Appeals
dismissed an action by a California attorney to recover for legal services rendered
to a New York resident in the State of
New York. The problems resulting from
the interstate practice of law were discussed in the Spring 1965 issue of The
Catholic Lawyer.2 The decision reached
by the Court of Appeals (by a vote of
four-to-three) is at variance with the
position adopted by the author of that
comment.
The plaintiff-attorney in Spivak was
licensed to practice law in California.
17ld. at p. 29, col. 1.
IS Ibid.*
116 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d 329, 263 N.Y.S.2d
953 (1965).
The Attorney's Dilemma-Practice
2 Comment,
of Law in a Foreign State, 11 CATHOLIc LAW.
145 (1965).

The defendant-client, a resident of New
York, retained the plaintiff to aid in her
divorce litigation. After explaining to the
defendant that he was not licensed to
practice in New York and, consequently,
could do no more than consult and advise, the plaintiff came to New York. He
spent fourteen days here giving advice
and performing similar legal services for
the defendant. The defendant, subsequently, refused to pay the plaintiff's fee
and the plaintiff sued. The Court of
Appeals took the position that an out-ofstate attorney is nothing more than a
layman and cannot indulge in legal services without being licensed in New York.
The plaintiff being in violation of the
penal statutes which forbid the practice
of law in New York by any person not
licensed by the state," was found not
entitled to collect the reasonable value of
his services.
The result in this case underscores the
conservative approach to the problem of
the practice of law in foreign jurisdictions.
The penal statutes forbidding this type of
activity are not directed at out-of-state
attorneys in particular, but rather, are
aimed at the person who practices law
without being certified. However, the
courts apply these statutes to both laymen
and out-of-state attorneys. This application does not seem justified in light of
modern social and legal developments.
The defendant in Spivak desired a
specialist in the divorce area. She solicited
the plaintiff's services, even though he
took great care to make her aware that
he was not licensed in New York. There
was no question of a holding out or
SNY. PEN. LAW §§ 270, 271.

12
fraudulent representation on his part.
While a foreign attorney is not amenable
to the supervision and control that the
New York courts have over a New York
attorney, the defendant in Spivak was
granted a degree of protection from dereliction of duty on the part of the attorney
by the recent "long arm" statutes which
would appear to make the California
attorney amenable to a malpractice suit
4
in New York.

See, e.g., CPLR 302(a).

EVIDENCE
(Continued)
tence. Following this, the experts should
submit written reports of their findings
and then give oral testimony relative to
their conclusions.
Although the general law of the Church
demands that physicians, expert in the
field of psychiatry, be engaged by the
tribunal to evaluate available evidence, the
judges are enjoined to evaluate their conclusions carefully. Where expert opinion
is based on proven facts, it would be rash
indeed for the judge to reject such findings. By the same token, if the experts
have not logically and properly arrived at
their conclusions from factual evidence
surrounding the circumstances in a given
case, it would likewise be gravely erroneous
for the judge to accord such findings
favorable acceptance. In nowise are ex-
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The penal statutes that the Court relied
upon in reaching its decision exist for the
benefit and protection of the public, and
not to protect the vested interests of New
York attorneys. Their main thrust, it
would seem, is aimed at the layman or
out-of-state attorney who falsely represents that he is a certified New York
attorney. They ought not to be applied
to out-of-state attorneys who engage in
some legal practice in New York at the
request of a resident of the state who, for
a variety of possible reasons, desires to
employ him.

perts to be considered co-judges. They
are to be considered as expert witnesses,
skilled in their particular profession, whose
knowledge has been placed at the disposal
of the tribunal.
Summing up this discussion, the following points may be made:
1. Marriage comes into being by the
rational consent of the contracting parties;
2. Consent and, therefore, the validity of a marriage may be rendered
invalid by mental illness;
3. The ability to give valid consent
is couched in the phrase "due discretion
proportionate to the marriage contract";
4. The focal point in all trials involving mental illness is the respondent's
condition at the moment of the exchange
of consent;
5. In cases of alleged invalidity of
the marriage contract due to mental

THE ADVOCATE

illness, the sources of proof are found
in documentary evidence, in the established presumptions of law and in the
personal presumptions of the judges, in

ADVOCATE
(Continued)
simulate their consent. The more plausible and grave, even subjectively, the
reason, the more incontestable will the
arguments be in favor of nullity. The
Advocate will find corroborating proofs
in the moral standard of the person simulating consent; in his admission of simulation, particularly if made under oath and
immediately or shortly after the marriage
ceremony; in circumstances surrounding
the case and pointing to simulation; and
in the testimony of witnesses or documentary evidence confirming the claim of
the parties. It is obvious that the entire
process of investigation can be accomplished only by a prepared and totally
dedicated mind.
Indeed, there is a great need for the
entry of the lay civil lawyer into the field
of ecclesiastical case law, either as an
able assistant to priest-Advocates, or as
the sole advisor to the parties. It may be
objected that the introduction of civil
lawyers into the tribunals will bring about
an increase in the cost of the processes.

the sworn depositions of the plaintiff
and the witnesses, and, finally, in the
opinions of the psychiatric experts engaged by the tribunal.

This is undeniably true, for, when a client
can afford it, an Advocate has the right
not simply to token fees, but to a just
remuneration in proportion to the importance, difficulty and length of the case.
Even though the policy of gratuitous legal
assistance is well grounded in this country,
I am inclined to believe that the question
of fees would be an obstacle only for a
small segment of the people who approach
the tribunal. The great majority of the
petitioners will realize the importance,
with respect to time and success, of
having a qualified Advocate to assist them
in a very personal and effective manner.
For those who lack adequate means of
support, the court itself could supply the
Advocate with a reasonable subsidy taken
from a special fund provided for by the
diocese.
Whatever the type, range, and purpose
of the activities of lay civil lawyers, I am
convinced that their introduction into
ecclesiastical courts would serve to upgrade, sharpen, and develop Church law
and adapt it to modern day requirements.
In his role as Advocate, the civil lawyer
could find a challenging task, and could
fulfill an apostolate for which the Church
today has so much need.

